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MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM G. HAAN 



THE DIVISION AS A FIGHTING 
MACHINE 



BY / 

MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM G: HAAN 




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Reprinted from the Wisconsin Magazine of History 
Volume IV, Number 1, September, 1920 



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THE DIVISION AS A FIGHTING MACHINE 

WHAT IT IS, HOW PREPARED FROM ITS INCEPTION 

TO ITS ACTION IN BATTLE, AND ITS TROUBLES 

AND PLEASURES IN ITS HARDEST DAY'S 

FIGHT, FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE 

DIVISION COMMANDER 

Major General William G. Haan 

It is my purpose to show in this paper, very briefly, the 
outHnes of a division organization, the theory of its training, 
in general what it is composed of; to present a very brief 
outline, also, of its early experience in training and in action; 
and finally to give as accurate a picture as I can of its 
supreme test when after many days' fighting it was called 
upon to do in a single thrust a task which in its overpowering 
magnitude well-nigh unnerved its commander. 

This day was the fourteenth of October, 1918, when the 
Thirty-second Division was called upon to assault, capture, 
and pass over the last organized line of the famous Hinden- 
burg position, in the Meuse-Argonne offensive. This line 
included the high and strongly held position south of the 
village of Romagne and extended through the heights known 
as La Cote Dame Marie. A description of this position will 
be given later. 

First, then, let us go back and look for a moment upon 
the Division as it was organized from the troops of Wiscon- 
sin and Michigan in Texas, where many new units had to be 
formed and where none of the old units fitted. A complete 
reorganization had to be made. All of this was accomplished 
with the loyal support of the senior oflficers and subordinate 
oflScers, who must have felt very keenly seeing their old 
organizations with which they had been serving for many 
months thus disrupted for the purpose of making a fighting 
unit on modern lines. To the credit of all these officers and 



4 Major General William G. Haan 

men let it be said that no complaint ever reached the 
Division Commander; let it be further said that the brigade 
commanders and regimental commanders with whom I had 
occasion daily to confer showed only a spirit of wishing to 
help make a fighting unit. 

We shall pass by these early stages, merely remarking 
that while the reorganization was going on the training did 
not stop. The full seven hours of training went on daily on 
the drill grounds, on the ranges, on the bayonet courses, in 
the schools, and everywhere, while in the office the staff was 
patiently working on reorganization under a pK)licy adopted 
by the Division Commander after full consultation and 
agreement with the brigade commanders. 

One word here in regard to training : From the beginning 
it was one of my principle functions to keep before the eyes 
and minds of the officers and men the fact that the Thirty- 
second Division was going to fight; that all of our training 
must be conducted with that end constantly in view; and 
that only such officers should accompany the Division to 
France as by their physical fitness, their age, and their apti- 
tude for commanding men in battle were considered fully 
qualified for leading against the enemy the splendid men of 
which the Division was to be composed. 

For many years, in fact since its organization, the only 
kind of fighting for which the United States Army has been 
trained is the offensive. We have always believed that it is 
only offensive action that can win battles and wars; and 
under that theory it became the duty of the Division Com- 
mander at these early stages to visualize his division in 
future offensive action, in order that he could adopt a proper 
doctrine of training so as to instill into each man and each 
element which were finally to make up his fighting unit that 
kind of training which would make it of most use in a fight- 
ing machine in which offensive tactics were the only tactics 
that were to be used in battle. 



The Division as a Fighting Machine 5 

Such visualization by the particular Division Com- 
mander in reference was a rather dilQBcult procedure, as 
will be realized when it is remembered that the largest force 
he had ever commanded was only slightly in excess of the 
number of commissioned officers he now had in his com- 
mand — still more difficult when it is remembered that the 
methods of warfare, the tactical operations that had taken 
place in this war had given somewhat of a setback to our 
theory of training for the offensive only. The difficulties of 
this situation were somewhat increased when we read in the 
first paragraph of training instructions issued from the 
Army War College the following expression: "Trench war- 
fare is of paramount importance." Fortunately, before a 
system of trenches could be completed and much instruc- 
tion given this particular paragraph in the War Department 
instructions was revoked, and we went back to our original 
theory of offensive tactics only. In this connection it may 
be interesting to note that as late as June 16, 1918, the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies issued elaborate 
instructions to all the allied armies as to how defensive 
warfare should be carried on to meet German attacks. I 
will not quote here all of that paper, but merely the last few 
sections, which show how the French Commander-in-Chief 
was thinking at that late date. He says : 

In a word our command can prepare a defensive battle corresponding 
to the offensive method practiced by the enemy. 

This method above all aims at disorganizing the command, not 
allov.'ing it time to make judicious dispositions. The method will be 
outv/itted if our command has laid out for itself in advance a line of 
rational conduct, if it has drawn up a program that is capable of as 
sure and rapid execution as possible, and if it then has a strength of 
purpose to hold to it by directing the battle at every moment. 

This mastery of the command is communicated instantly to the 
troops. It is the challenge for the execution by these troops of the most 
difficult mission. 

(Signed) F. Foch 

This was on June 16 when our Division was in the front 
line near Belfort — the very day on which I took over the 



6 Major General William G. Haan 

active tactical command of my own Division and the Ninth 
French Division. This was the first time an American 
officer had the honor of commanding a French Division. 

Aside from what is above quoted, some elaborate in- 
structions are contained in General Foch's paper showing 
that the front line elements, the outpost troops, must stay 
in their places and fight to the last man, with a view to 
breaking up the enemy's advancing lines so that our battle 
positions or the second line would be able to hold them 
completely. In transmitting these instructions to division 
and higher commanders, General Pershing added the follow- 
ing postscript to these instructions: — v. 

Commanders will show by their attitude that they give full, loyal, 
and sympathetic support to the execution of the above instructions of 
the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied iVrmies. 

It is very evident that General Pershing, however, was 
not satisfied with this defensive attitude, for on July 11, 1918, 
he issued the following, both papers reaching division com- 
manders on the same day : — 

INSTRUCTIONS ON TACTICAL DISPOSITION 

1. The ultimate purpose of the American Army is the decisive 
defeat of the enemy, and not the mere passive result of the pure defen- 
sive. To realize this ultimate purpose, it is essential that every officer 
and soldier of these forces be imbued with the offensive spirit. 

Then General Pershing goes on to describe somewhat in 
detail the methods of preparing the troops in morale and in 
training. In fact, he lays down the doctrine of training to 
get the troops not only instructed correctly for the kind of 
fighting that he believes in, but to get them into the right 
frame of mind, the right kind of morale, the right kind of 
esprit de corps. These latter we found very important con- 
siderations during battle. 

Perhaps these quotations may throw a little further light 
upon the statements made above that from the very begin- 
ning of training the commander must visualize the kind of 



The Division as a Fighting Machine 1 

fighting his division will be called upon to do; otherwise 
he cannot adopt the correct "doctrine" of training the vari- 
ous elements. 

One must now keep in mind that for the next seven or 
eight months there was daily work from morning until 
night under the guidance of the same idea, namely, to pro- 
duce from a conglomeration of men, animals, and material 
a machine which would carry out in battle the single idea of 
a single mind, itself controlled by instructions from the 
higher command, making this smallest fighting unit of all 
arms, the division, in itself work as a single element in 
conjunction with hundreds of other similar elements that 
made up the great Allied Army, which again was finally 
controlled by a single mind. It is the ultimate in organiza- 
tion to make all elements of an army composed of some 
twenty different nationalities speaking different languages — 
some seven million men operating on half a dozQn separate 
fronts — respond to the will of a single commander. This 
power of organization and the putting of it into effect won 
the war. 

After four months of work and training and study and 
organization and reorganization in Texas it was a pleasure 
to find that when the order to move came the officers of the 
various grades in the Division had grasped many of their 
functions, and it was no longer necessary to lead them about 
and tell them what to do. They began to understand what 
was meant by orders. Nothing further need be said in re- 
gard to this first move of the Thirty-second Division than 
that each unit was ready to entrain at the place and time set 
by the schedule for the trains. Unfortunately, the train 
crews had not had the same kind of training and, in conse- 
quence, were never at the appointed place at the designated 
hour; and our Division straggled from Texas to New York, 
a glowing example of the inefficiency of our railroad service, 
of the very efiiciency of which we had heard so much. 



8 Major General William G. Haan 

From twenty-four to forty-eight hours late upon arrival 
was the rule and not the exception for trains in New York; 
they were all late, without any exceptions. 

A complete division is difficult to visualize. One must 
see it with all its armament, troops, and trains to begin to 
understand — infantry brigades, machine gun battalions, 
artillery, engineers, trench mortar battery, signal corps, 
ammunition trains, supply trains, sanitary trains, mobile 
repair shops, medical corps troops, field hospitals, ambu- 
lance companies, brigade staffs, division staff. In personnel 
28,000, animals some 9,000, motor cars, motor trucks, tanks, 
balloons, air planes, and last but not least, the military 
police. In a single close column — men marching in column of 
fours well closed up — the division is now more than thirty 
miles long. It was a liberal education in military organiza- 
tion thus to see the First Division upon its return parade 
in New York and Washington with all its transportation, 
men, animals, and full campaign equipment. The division 
headquarters is the nerve center of the entire organization. 
It is the business center; and when the division has been 
trained for battle it promptly responds to the plans of its 
commander, promulgated in orders through the staff and 
system of communication. 

It is not necessary to dwell upon the mortifying fact that 
upon our arrival in France early in March we were made 
temporarily a replacement and labor division, because we 
got out of that; and right glad were all the men in the 
Division when they heard that we were going to the front. 
Let us pass over this period merely by saying that as soon 
as we got our men together again our training started anew, 
and when we got on the front line our training continued 
with greater speed and with greater effectiveness, but always 
with the offensive spirit. The doctrine of training had that 
objective in view all the time. 



The Division as a Fighting Machine 9 

While the Division was in Texas in training, we worked 
under our old staff system. Upon arrival in France, our 
staff officers were gradually taken away from us and new 
staff officers assigned. These new officers had had some 
training in the American Staff College in France, where they 
were studying the handling, equipping, and fighting of 
larger bodies of men than the world had ever before known. 
Gradually the staff work was taken over by the proper 
staff officers, thereby relieving the Commander in a 
greater and greater measure from details and permitting 
him to give more attention to his front line work and the 
combat preparation of his combat troops for front line work, 
I have estimated that while in Texas seventy per cent of 
the time of the Division Commander was required for 
administrative work. In June, six months later, when the 
Division was in the front line near Belfort, only ten per 
cent of his time was necessary for administrative work; and 
when finally the Division went into the big fight north of 
the Marne only about five per cent of his time was neces- 
sary; yet the functioning of everything was greatly superior 
to what it had been before. 

When on the twenty -ninth of July our Division relieved 
the Third Division, then for the first time it became the 
duty of the Division Commander to make a plan of battle 
and of his staff to prepare the battle orders. Here, then, 
was to be put to the test whether or not our doctrine of 
training for fighting on the oftensive had been correct — 
whether we were going to take the offensive in battle, or 
whether we were to remain on the defensive. Please note 
that the twenty-ninth of July, 1918, was only eighteen 
days after General Pershing issued his famous "Instruc- 
tions on Tactical Disposition," a part of which I have 
already quoted. I may remark here that while it was 
indeed gratifying to receive from our own Commander- 
in-Chief these instructions, they made no change in the 



10 Major General William G. Haan 

training that was going on in the Thirty-second Division. 
That Division had trained for offensive combat from the 
day it arrived in Camp Mac Arthur at Waco, Texas. It 
continued that kind of training during all of its training 
periods and it continued that kind of fighting up to Novem- 
ber 11, when the fighting stopped. 

I cannot say that I felt any anxiety whatever as to the 
outcome of the first battle of the Thirty-second Division. 
It was not a very great undertaking, although our gallant 
Third Division had made several attempts to take the 
position and each time had to withdraw. It was too ex- 
hausted after its heavy fighting in driving the enemy across 
the Marne and up the hills to the north of the river to make 
another great effort; but our fresh troops went forward as at 
drill, and never for a moment did I think that they would 
do anything else — never for a moment did it occur to me 
that they might fail in this first attempt. I felt sure that 
the kind of training they had received and the kind of men 
they were would guarantee success in the task that was 
given them. In this they fully justified every expectation. 
They took their objective by assault, organized it, and held 
it until they got orders to proceed to the next objective, and 
so on, and so on, and so on continuously until eight days 
later they had driven the enemy back nineteen kilometers 
and had captured the famous stronghold and railhead of 
Fismes and driven the enemy across the Vesle River. Then 
the Division was withdrawn and given a short period of ten 
days for reorganization and further training. Then it was 
given another task. Everything began to move more 
smoothly, and orders given by the Division Commander 
were immediately visualized by the corresponding move- 
ment of the elements of the Division called upon to move. 
Everywhere was order, and everything was done in an 
orderly manner; it was businesslike. The Division Com- 
mander's office, though not as a rule in a comfortable place, 



The Division as a Fighting Machine 11 

was always characterized by a business spirit and business- 
like transaction of business. The Chief of Staff and his 
assistants had their ofRces— if they may be called offices- 
arranged always in an orderly manner; electric lights 
appeared as regularly as darkness came. And so the Division 
was developed into a fighting machine composed of all the 
elements necessary for carrying on combat. 

After the Division had completed its second great battle 
with General Mangin's Tenth Army with the capture of 
Juvigny, a key point in the line, and approximately 1,000 
prisoners and much material in the way of guns and ammu- 
nition, it was taken away and sent to our great First Army, 
with which it was finally to fight its greatest and last battle. 

I fear it will be a difficult thing to give a description that 
will be anything like a reasonably accurate picture of what 
confronted the Division when it went into the front line 
near the famous town of Montfaucon, where the German 
Crown Prince had had his observation point to observe the 
German Army in its fighting and attacks on the Verdun 
positions. It is impossible to describe these conditions to 
one who has not been over the ground, I think, and make 
him realize quite what the situation there was. A Con- 
gressman traveling through these woods in attempting to 
describe what he saw remarked as follows : 

I saw such spots where in the little forest American boys laid down 
their priceless lives— a little forest filled v/ith tangled vines, and fallen 
trees, and jagged rocks, and little hidden fissures, and tangled \'ines, 
and fallen trees, and tumbled, jumbled saplings, and deep trenches, and 
concrete peepholes, and German dugouts, and interlaced branches— so 
that when we had followed the Captain who was our escort and who 
himself had fought in that fight— when we had followed him in and out, 
up and down, and over and under, I for one was utterly exhausted 
without any pack and without any burden of ammunition. 

Let me say here that this Congressman passed through this 
little wood with a guide, not under fire, in the daytime, and 
at his leisure; let me say further that the Thirty-second 
Division passed through this wood on the night of Septem- 



12 Major General William G. Haan 

ber 28 in a cold downpour of rain, in the darkest night 
that I have ever seen, or rather felt, at a time when the only 
road or trail through No Man's Land, some three miles 
wide and through these little woods, was completely blocked 
with stalled vehicles so that the men had to pick their way 
alongside of the road, over tangled wire, in mud, and under 
fire of the enemy's artillery. Yet there were no complaints. 
The Division had become a fighting unit; the Division Com- 
mander was personally leading his Division through these 
tangled, jumbled saplings and trenches and wire, himself 
having reconnoitered the previous day the trail by which 
he was to lead his Division during this famous night to the 
relief of the Thirty-seventh Division, which had become 
exhausted and which had to be withdrawn from the line. 
The men marched all night with their 75-pound packs, 
arriving at the northern edge of the woods, a description 
of which has been attempted. At midnight I found the 
headquarters and the Commander of the Thirty-seventh 
Division and presented my orders for the relief of his Divi- 
sion. This was the first information he had that his Division 
was to be relieved, because metallic telephonic connection 
had been interrupted between his Division and the Corps 
Headquarters. The next day it continued to rain, and it 
continued to be cold, but, fortunately, it was also misty, so 
that during the daytime it was practicable to locate the 
elements of the Division we were to relieve; and it was also 
practicable during the daytime to relieve all but the front 
elements of the entire Division; during the early hours of 
the next night the remainder of the Division was relieved. 

Therefore, on the first of October our Division was again 
crouching for another offensive. Its front elements were 
again in contact with the enemy on a line running east and 
west a few hundred meters south of the village of Cierges, 
the same name as the first village that the Division captured 
in its first battle. The evening of October 1 found our line 



The Division as a Fighting Machine 13 

to the north of this Cierges No. 2 and the village in our 
possession. 

I will not attempt a description of how the Division 
advanced from this initial position to its final jump-off line 
on the morning of October 14, except to say that every inch 
of this ground was fought over and fought for by the enemy, 
and that while the Division had no large pitched battles in 
gaining these five kilometers of ground, yet it had continu- 
ous fighting by most of its elements for a period of two 
weeks, during which our losses were approximately 4,000. 
It should be observed that this was mostly open ground and 
that the enemy was strongly intrenched on the heights to 
the south and west of Romagne, which was the position 
that had to be finally taken by assault. 

When we had reached within about two thousand yards of 
this position, or perhaps a little more, a combined effort of all 
the divisions in our immediate vicinity was made to advance 
the entire line and if possible carry the strong position — 
the Kriemhilde Stellung. For this very careful preparation 
had been made, a careful plan had been drawn up, and the 
orders for the battle most carefully prepared in detail. A 
chart graphically representing the instructions given was 
distributed with the order, and I have heard from all regi- 
mental commanders and many others to the effect that this 
chart was a great assistance to them in maneuvering their 
units in accordance with the plans of the Division Comman- 
der, as expressed in the battle orders. 

The advance was made as planned for a distance of about 
fifteen hundred meters — that is until the advance elements 
came practically in touch with the enemy's wire protecting 
the strong Kriemhilde line on the heights to the south- 
west of Romagne. In two places — one directly to the 
south of the village of Romagne and the other in the left 
center of the sector — did our troops succeed in penetrating 
this powerful position. The remainder of the line was held 



14 Major General William G. Haan 

up in front of the wire, and these penetrations had been so 
narrow and the forces going through so small that it was 
impossible for them to hold their positions ; in consequence 
of this they were withdrawn. 

I desire here for a moment to refer to the only serious 
error that was made during the entire fighting in transmit- 
ting information from the front line to the Division Com- 
mander. The battalion which had penetrated into the 
enemy's position in the left center of the sector sent word 
back that they had penetrated the enemy's line and had 
captured the strong position of La Cote Dame Marie. This 
position was the key point of the entire Kriemhilde line, 
which was the last organized and strongly -held line of the 
Hindenburg position. I had these reports briefly investi- 
gated and received confirmatory information to the efi^ect 
that we occupied the key position, La Cote Dame Marie, 
and the entire trench position from that point to the right 
of the sector and I so r^eported to the higher command. It 
was mainly upon this information that the entire army 
received orders to attack along its whole front on the morn- 
ing of October 14. 

It was not until about noon of October 13, and after the 
order that a general attack would be made on the morning 
of the fourteenth had been received from the higher com- 
mand, that I ascertained the real truth about the position 
of my front line. You can imagine, therefore, the state of 
my mind when I learned the cold facts that we had not cap- 
tured the key position; that we did not occupy the strong 
position across the front of our sector which was covered by 
triple lines of barbed wire; that this position was still held 
by the enemy; and that our troops were still south of that 
position but close up to the wire. For just about five 
minutes, when the real facts became positively known to 
me — when the real facts had fully permeated my somewhat 
dazed brain that not only had I been misinformed but that I 



The Division as a Fighting Machine 15 

in turn had misinformed the higher command as to my 
position in such an important place and at such a critical 
time — for about five minutes I suffered the greatest depres- 
sion of my life. It was perhaps a fortunate circumstance 
that when I received this information I was alone except for 
my orderly, who was near by, and therefore I could not 
communicate any feelings of depression to my staff. When 
I had time to recover I called my Chief of Staff and told 
him that since we did not have the position we would have 
to take it and that we had no time to lose. The next morn- 
ing the entire line was to advance in a great battle. Those 
instructions had already been received from the higher 
command. I made my plan — made it brief. I knew exactly 
how I wanted to attack the positions with the greatest 
possibility of success. After having completed that plan 
and having given some instructions to the Artillery Com- 
mander, I proceeded on a visit to my brigade and regimental 
commanders, leaving to my staff the preparation of the 
battle orders. I felt that now as never before, and perhaps 
as never again, would it be necessary to raise the morale of 
our troops to the very highest pitch, to make them believe 
that not only must the position be taken but that we must 
make them believe that we would take it — that we could 
take it; in fact, the offensive spirit had to be driven into the 
troops between noon and midnight of that day so that when 
the call came for them to advance at daylight the next 
morning nothing in front of them should stop them. 

I reached my brigade commanders, who had their 
headquarters close together — so close that in a minute I 
could call them together and have a conference. I told 
them what was in my mind in regard to taking the position — 
that it was not a question of whether we could or could not, 
but that we would take it the next morning, and no one 
must discuss it in any other sense; that we would take that 
position and nothing else would do ; we would not only take 



16 Major General William G. Haan 

the position, but would go on beyond and keep on going; 
and that they must assist me in putting such an offensive 
spirit into our troops before midnight of that night that 
nothing should stop them the next morning. I think I was 
fortunate in that while I was talking to my brigade com- 
manders on that very point, General Summerall, the Corps 
Commander, who had been at my headquarters, and when 
he found that I had gone to see my brigade commanders 
had followed me, came into the conference as I was telling 
them what had to be done. His assistance in putting fight- 
ing spirit into the brigade commanders, their staffs, and 
the other officers that were there was very helpful. I think 
General Summerall has perhaps the power of inspiring men 
around him to a greater extent for battle than any other 
man I have known. I said a little while ago that for a few 
minutes I was probably more depressed than during any 
other period of my life. But when General Summerall got 
through talking, my spirits were jubilant; I no longer had a 
thought in my mind that we would not be successful; and 
the same idea could be seen permeating through all the 
officers who were present at that conference. It not only 
inspired them to believe that nothing could stop us, but 
it inspired them to tell their comrades the same thing and 
perhaps more — that the whole army was going forward and 
that nothing should stop the Thirty-second Division un- 
der any circumstances. And so the word went out; and the 
morale of the Division was raised to the highest pitch pos- 
sible. Perhaps it was better that the period was so short; 
it spurred everybody on with anxiety mingled with excite- 
ment. They knew that they did not have to wait long. 
Word went out before midnight that night just when we were 
going over the top, at least as far down as it could safely be 
passed ; all platoon commanders were informed ; they doubt- 
less told some of their most reliable noncommissioned 
officers. They knew how far the word could be passed 



The Division as a Fighting Machine 17 

among their own little units and still be safe from the enemy. 
All of this had been brought about by training and experi- 
ence. It was no longer necessary to say to a brigade com- 
mander, a regimental commander, or a battalion comman- 
der, or a company commander: "This information is 
confidential and must go no further." They had learned to 
know what information must be kept away from the very 
front elements. They had learned to take the initiative not 
only in fighting, but in thinking. They had learned the 
game of war in the front line. They had learned how to 
obey even though it be to go straight to their death. 

And now let us stop for a moment and take a look as 
well as we can at the position the Division was facing — the 
post of command, the Division Commander, the position of 
the brigade commanders, the positions of the artillery, the 
positions of the ammunition supply and the food supply, 
the positions of the dressing stations and the field hospitals, 
and the lines of communication whereby the Division was 
kept alive by the activities of the service of supply, the 
road control, the stragglers' posts, and First Aid stations. 
I think one is liable to overlook in a large measure the 
activities back of the line, the complexities of which are 
little understood outside of the quiet hard workers who 
had this in charge. Nothing but perfect staff organiza- 
tion and well-nigh perfect cooperation between all the 
branches of supply can keep a division going, much less an 
army. 

Standing on the heights of Montfaucon and looking to 
the north about five miles away could be clearly seen a well- 
defined ridge covered with forest towering some three 
hundred feet above and dominating the low intervening 
terrain, mostly open, rolling country, affording, apparently, 
little cover from view for advancing troops; cultivated 
fields without crops; small patches of scrub oak; several 
small low lying villages, huddled snugly in ravines with 



18 Major General William G. Haan 

their thin church steeples visible from all directions. On the 
evening of October 13 as I rode forward over this ground it 
looked from a distance almost peaceful, except for white 
puffs of smoke here and there indicating registration by 
the enemy artillery; but as I rode forward every ravine 
hidden from the view of the enemy's towering position 
showed activity. Guns were here and there in position; 
others were making ready for action ; and as I moved further 
forward the surface of the ground which from a distance 
seemed calm and natural now showed a ghastly ruptured 
condition, torn and mangled by shells from the small pit of 
the 75 to the cellar-like craters made by the heaviest shells. 
Some of the craters were fifteen feet deep and thirty feet in 
diameter. The villages, which from a distance seemed still 
to have the semblance of habitation, were indeed but masses 
of ruins; among this tangled mass of frightful destruction 
were seen as if in peaceful slumber the dead bodies alike of 
friends and foes who had made the supreme sacrifice, each 
doubtless being driven by an irresistible force which he 
believed almost spiritual guidance. A sad commentary 
and a frightful indictment of the untamed selfishness of the 
present-day political leaders of mankind. 

The Division was now crouched for its last and greatest 
effort. Let us try to make a sort of mental picture of the 
Division as a living thing, a living organization, as it was 
now prepared to spring forward. Beginning then with 
what we call the front elements — including perhaps two 
thousand infantrymen and machine gunmen — these four 
battalions were side by side, each occupying an area in a 
line. The area of a battalion in this case was perhaps a 
thousand meters wide and a thousand to fifteen hundred 
meters deep. Over each of these areas was distributed a 
battalion — perhaps two companies, occupying the forward 
half, and two companies the rearward half; but as one 
looked at it, if that could be done, from the air and saw 



The Division as a Fighting Machine 19 

all the men, it would look as if they were more or less evenly 
distributed over the area shown, occupying the position 
behind a little rise, but never grouped. 

Let us go back through this Divisional area into the 
Divisional sector. It is about three miles wide at the front 
and extends back for a distance of more than ten miles to 
the railhead. As we go back through this area we find first, 
the second line of battalions — the support battalions nearly 
a mile in the rear of the first line. Then going back another 
mile or two we find the reserve battalions. Scattered 
among these we find groups of artillery ready for 
action or actually in action. We find first-aid stations, 
dressing stations, stragglers' posts under control of the mili- 
tary police, for picking up exhausted men, or men who have 
lost their way, or men who have been shell-shocked or 
temporarily deranged in their minds. These stragglers' 
posts collect them, give them hot food, and soon the men 
are again ready to go to the front. Here we find regimental 
command posts, brigade command posts, and under such 
cover as can be found, food depots, ammunition dumps, 
rolling kitchens, and a little further back we have the field 
hospitals and the Division Headquarters — the nerve center 
of the whole Division. As we pass across the area we run 
across many wires — insulated wires — some lying on the 
ground and some half in the air. These are the communica- 
tions — the nerves of the Division — carrying to the various 
elements and commands encouragements and frequently 
commendations of the Division Commander. Then as we 
go on we find great ammunition columns, supply columns, 
herds of horses carefully scattered on grazing ground. These 
are the great number of animals, perhaps, eight or nine 
thousand in the horse transportation of the Division. The 
guns are now in position and the horses are taken back as 
much out of artillery fire as possible and given an oppor- 
tunity to subsist themselves as much as possible on what 



20 Major General William G. Haan 

grass they can find. Then we see at every road crossing 
miUtary poHce with bands on their arms, who have charge of 
traffic control to make sure that on one-way roads vehicles 
pass only in one direction. And scattered through the area 
from the front to the rear we find groups of signal corps men 
repairing wires — putting in additional nerves of the Divi- 
sion. We find from the very front to the rear engineer 
detachments repairing roads and bridges. We find scat- 
tered likewise through the whole area sanitary squads of 
medical men with litters to take care of the sick and 
wounded. We find a constant stream of wounded going to 
the rear in ambulances and we see desolation and destruc- 
tion everywhere, as has already been indicated. Picture then 
the men forming this Division about ready to make the 
great assault in cold and rainy October weather. These men 
had little clothing, no shelter, were covered from head to 
foot with mud, had been continuously in action under the 
enemy's heavy fire for two long weeks. Their comrades 
had melted away until now the companies were less than 
half strength. The losses among the officers were even 
greater; yet their Commander still believed them capable of 
a great effort. He called upon them for this supreme test; 
and as will shortly be seen they responded with irresistible 
determination. 

It may be asked in passing why a Division is organized 
in such great depth. Primarily this is necessary to give 
great and continuous driving power. As the front line ele- 
ments melt away in battle the next succeeding elements 
take their places in the front and so on and so on. It is a 
sort of revolving machine where in turn each succeeding 
echelon passes over the front line and is thus able to give a 
new impetus to the forward movement of the great machine. 

On the night of October 13 as I went to my headquarters 
after spending half the night in the front lines, I felt confi- 
dent that we were going through the next morning and 



The Division as a Fighting Machine 21 

while I was satisfied, yet I had no desire for sleep. I forgot 
that it was night. When the artillery started its action 
actually on time at dawn, and when everything started 
as planned, I felt a certain amount of relief and in spite of 
my desire to know what was going on I fell asleep in the 
midst of the deafening roar of the heavy artillery and con- 
tinued sleeping until about eight o'clock in the morning. 
I needed no time to make my toilet, no time to dress. I 
forgot to eat my breakfast as I had forgotten to eat my 
supper the night before, went to the place where all reports 
were received and where the operations map was kept, 
found that reports were beginning to come in — reports 
which had in them some of the elements of hope and yet 
without that definiteness necessary before encouraging 
reports should be made to the higher command. Gradually, 
however, came reports from the various parts of the front 
which, taken together, indicated that progress was being 
made. The battle order required the left center to go over 
the top first; the artillery lifted and moved forward off the 
enemy fortified position there first. The One Hundred 
Twenty-sixth Infantry followed through and a message 
was received that it was following the barrage. Another 
message — that the One Hundred Twenty-seventh In- 
fantry on the left had gone against the heavy wire in the 
woods and against the steep hills of La Cote Dame Marie 
and was stopped. Another message — that the right battal- 
ion on the extreme right of the sector, a battalion of the 
One Hundred Twenty-eighth Infantry, had penetrated 
the line and had advanced behind the barrage as far as the 
outskirts of Romagne where it was held up, that the Infan- 
try Commander had stopped the barrage in front of that 
part of the line and had requested artillery fire on the town. 
I directed the Artillery Commander to place all of his avail- 
able heavy guns, including two batteries of 8" Howitzers, 
army artillery, which had been placed under my control. 



22 Major General William G. Haan 

The roaring of the heavy cannon soon told that these orders 
were promptly complied with. In the meantime further 
information was received that the One Hundred Twenty- 
sixth Infantry in the left center was still following the 
barrage and was approaching the first objective about one 
mile north of the main position where the jump-off was 
made, but that the One Hundred Twenty-seventh In- 
fantry was unable to advance. I suggested to the Brigade 
Commander that he send additional troops through the 
gap through which the One Hundred Twenty-sixth 
Infantry had penetrated and attack La Cote Dame Marie 
from the east by a flank movement to the left. At 1:50 
o'clock I sent the following message to Corps Headquar- 
ters: 'T believe we will get to our objectives before the day 
is over. Everything indicates that our men are fighting 
fine." I received a message from Lieutenant Gotschalk, 
who had succeeded to the command of the battalion of the 
One Hundred Twenty-eighth Infantry which had been 
held up to the south of Romagne, to stop firing on the town 
of Romagne — that he had succeeded with his battalion in 
moving around to the left of the town and had formed a line 
on the north side of it. This I could hardly believe. It was 
almost too good to be true, but I knew this officer's reports 
were reliable and gave the necessary instructions to comply 
with his requests. Things were becoming more cheerful. 
In the meantime the right center battalion, also of the One 
Hundred Twenty-eighth Infantry, had succeeded in de- 
molishing the remainder of the enemy's position and was 
moving forward in its sector. Shortly after this more good 
news came to the effect that the One Hundred Twenty- 
sixth Infantry had moved to the left and occupied part of the 
ridge of La Cote Dame Marie and still a little later that the 
One Hundred Twenty-seventh Infantry had flanked hill 
286, the extreme west end of La Cote Dame Marie, by going 
into the sector of the Forty-second Division, advancing in 




Operations Chart 



24 Major General William G. Haan 

that sector, and then taking it by a flank movement. The 
Staff at Headquarters was all smiles by this time. The 
One Hundred Twenty-sixth Infantry, operating from 
the right, and the One Hundred Twenty-seventh Infan- 
try, operating from the left, mopped up the ridge known as 
La Cote Dame Marie. This was an extremely strong posi- 
tion — in fact, it was so strong that a direct assault upon it 
from the front, for which it was built, would have cost the 
lives of hundreds and hundreds of men. The taking of this 
position by a double flank movement was one of the clever- 
est pieces of work of the entire war. This strong position 
was taken with a minimum loss and that part of its garrison 
which did not succeed in escaping was captured in the jaws 
of this double flank movement. We had now in our posses- 
sion the entire position which had given me so much anxiety. 

The action of the Division — a great mass made up of 
men, animals, motors, and material — in its slow forward 
movement seemed almost as one huge, living animal — 
stalling a little here and there, yet driven forward again as if 
by a living power actuated by a single huge, muscular body 
determined to keep on moving obstinately in one particular 
direction. The Division had in fact become a living ma- 
chine, an entity which responded to the will of its Comman- 
der whose commands as well as words of encouragement and 
commendation speeded through the nervous system of this 
huge, living animal, adjusted its various parts, and kept the 
propellers going; and though it stalled again and again, it 
never failed to respond until it had before night accom- 
plished more than its allotted task. It had gone beyond its 
objective and had justified all and more than its Comman- 
der had predicted for its day's work in his first message to 
the higher command. 

On the evening of the fourteenth, when I was visiting 
the brigade commanders and consulting with them as to the 



The Division as a Fighting Machine 25 

next day's operations, the Commander in Chief, General 
Pershing, visited our headquarters and placed his finger on 
the map and said, "I want that place" — the Bois de Chau- 
vignon. 

Our Chief of Staff must have had great pleasure in 
saying to General Pershing, "General, we have that position 
now, and General Haan has gone forward to see his brigade 
commanders with a view to driving farther ahead tomorrow 
morning." 

In this operation the Division earned its title, which was 
later given to it: "The Red Arrow" Division. Perhaps 
most of you have been told why the barred arrow was 
adopted as the Division insignia. Here is an example of how 
the Division made an arrow of itself and shot forward always 
at the critical moment. This was by no means the only 
time; it did the same thing in the two other battles in which 
it fought: the Second Battle of the Marne and the Battle 
of Juvigny. In the first it arrowed forward and captured the 
town of Fismes; with the Tenth French Army in the same 
way it captured the strong position of Juvigny, in both cases 
sticking its point forward arrow-like and exposing its flanks 
to get these positions. 

The remainder of the work of the Division in this remark- 
able battle is shown on the Operations Map; note that 
the "arrowhead" was completed. 

Upon arrival at my headquarters at midnight on Octo- 
ber 14 I awoke my stenographer, who was quietly sleeping 
on the floor of my spacious office, and dictated an order, 
which was sent out by telephone to brigade commanders, 
to be immediately dispatched to the troops. This order 
read in part as follows: 

I most heartily congratulate every officer and man on the splendid 
achievements of the day — of the many hard and successful days during 
three great battles, today marks the high point of accomplished success. 



26 Major General William G, Ilaan 

It is the more marked because it was done as a climax after fifteen days' 
continuous and frequently desperate fighting. 

It was for his conduct of this battle that the Division Com- 
mander was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal. 

At the close of the battle the following letter was received 
from the Corps Commander: 

The recent long service of the Thirty-second Division in the front 
line of the Fifth Army Corps has been characterized by such a fine 
example of soldierly effort that the Corps Commander commends you 
and your soldiers and officers for it. 

Under extremely difiicult circumstances, and over a rough, hilly, 
and wooded terrain, the Division broke through the enemy's strong lines 
(Kriemhilde Stellung) and reached and took its objectives. 

This effort and the result accomplished speak for themselves, but 
that you and your men may know that the Corps Commander appre- 
ciates their exertion, and acknowledges their success, he thanks each one. 



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